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ABSTRACT 
In reservation-based bandwidth sharing protocols, the base station relies on the stations’ 
requests to allocate time slots to them. Like most other protocols, reservation-based protocols 
were designed with the assumption that all stations respect the rules of the protocols. However, 
as mobile devices are becoming more intelligent and programmable, they can selfishly optimize 
their operations to obtain a larger share of common bandwidth. Here, we study reservation-based 
bandwidth sharing protocols considering the existence of selfish stations through game-theoretic 
perspectives. We show that this game admits a Nash equilibrium. Then, we prove the 
inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium. Game-theoretical analysis shows that local optimization in 
the bandwidth sharing problem with conflicted interests does not lead to any global 
optimization. 
Keywords. Nash equilibrium, Repeated game, Reservation-based. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid growth of personal networking, the demand for services in a mobile 
environment has been growing faster and more diverse. New protocols for personal 
communication must account for the presence of several different classes of traffic with diverse 
patterns and quality of service (QoS) requirements, and make sure that those applications coexist 
as comfortable as possible within the restrictive framework of mobile environment. The major 
advantage of reservation-based algorithms is that they provide a significant reduction in the 
number of collisions incurred during communication. Moreover, reservation-based protocols are 
very power efficient that is inherently collision free and avoids unnecessary idle listening, which 
are two major sources of energy consumption. 
Many reservation-based access protocols have been proposed for mobile networks, e.g.                
[1 - 6]. All the protocols mentioned above use a similar channel structure. Time on the uplink 
channel is divided into timeframes, and each timeframe is divided into a number of transmission 
slots and a number of possibly smaller minislots used for contention resolution. Transmission 
slots may be fixed or varied in length depending on protocols. Those approaches are efficient if 
all stations play by the rules of the protocols. However, we claim that this assumption is less and 
less appropriate, because the network adapters are becoming more programmable [7]. 
Despite the vast of work invested in improving reservation-based protocols, all of the 
studies of reservation-based protocols have ignored the system performance in the presence of 
selfish users. In this paper, we study the stability and efficiency of reservation-based protocols in 
wireless networks that contain selfish users. By selfish we designate the users who are ready to 
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tamper with their wireless interface in order to increase their own share of the common 
transmission resource. We assume these users to be rational, and not intend to harm other users 
without deriving a benefit from this misbehavior. The main motivation of this work is to study 
the performance of the system with selfish stations and design reservation-based access methods 
that could stabilize the network around a steady state at which the stations’ performance is fair 
and high efficiency. 
We first recall some basic concepts of game theory. A normal game is defined by a tuple 
(players, strategies, utility functions), each player has a set of strategies to choose, called 
strategy space, a utility (payoff) function of a player takes as input a strategy profile (a 
specification of strategies for every player) and yields a representation of utility as its output. A 
Nash equilibrium of a game is when there exists a strategy profile which fully specifies all 
actions in a game - such that no player could gain more by unilaterally changing its strategy. In a 
game there may exist many Nash equilibria, so that the social profit (sum of players’ utilities) of 
the game at each Nash equilibrium may get different values. The price of anarchy (PoA) is the 
ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium and the (social) optimal solution, and the price of 
stability (PoS) is the ratio between the best Nash equilibrium and the (social) optimal solution. 
Hence, when the system is at a Nash equilibrium then PoA is the lower bound, and PoS is the 
upper bound for the difference between the social profit at a Nash equilibrium and the optimal 
solution. 
In this work, we consider that a selfish station makes use of the easiest cheating technique: 
he reserves for a larger time slot to maximize its throughput. Although this cheating technique is 
straightforward, we show that studying its implications is far from trivial. In order to investigate 
the system with selfish stations, we make use of game theory. Here, we define a new game, 
named reservation game. In this game, each station is a player, the throughput it enjoys is its 
payoff, and its request represents its strategy. With assumption that the allocation scheme of the 
base station is fixed and public to every stations, we study the system where stations are players 
who compete for the bandwidth. We model this problem as a repeated game [9]. Analysis shows 
that the dynamic best response of players will make the system converge to a Nash equilibrium. 
We organize this paper as follows. In section 3, we define the problem and point out an 
optimal solution of it. Section 2 reviews game-theoretic approaches to channel access protocols. 
In section 4, we formulate the Reservation game, we prove for the existence of Nash equilibrium 
as well as the bound of price of anarchy. We conclude in section 5. 
2. PRIOR WORK 
Recently, much work on MAC layer protocols takes into account the selfish players. 
However, prior work on reservation-based protocols in wireless networks doesn’t consider the 
selfish behavior mobile stations. Slotted ALOHA and CSMA are two most popular MAC 
protocols which are investigated through gametheoretic perspectives.  
One of the earliest applications of game theory to medium access protocols is the work of 
Zander in [12] and [13]. However, the game is considered in cooperative nature and does not 
consider contention among selfish stations themselves. For the games in which players selfishly 
contend for the channel, researchers approach those problems in many different types of games.  
In the ALOHA games, many researchers formulate the problem as a repeated game [9] 
such as the work of MacKenzie et al. [14], Y. Jin et al. [15]. The Stochastic game [9] model is 
applied in the work of MacKenzie et al. [16], and Altman et al. [17]. Y. Cho et al. use single-
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stage Bayesian game [9] to approach the ALOHA game for the wireless networks in fading 
environments in [18]. Recently, R. Ma et al. [19] model the Aloha game as a Stackelberg game 
[9], where one of players is voted to be the leader and other players are followers. 
In the CSMA games, L. Chen et al. [20], and M. Cagalj et al. [11] use both static game and 
dynamic game to approach the problems of medium access control with selfish stations. The 
repeated game model is again used in the work of Konorski [10], and L. Galluccio [21]. Y. Cho 
et al. [18] applied single stage and multistage Bayesian game models for the CSMA protocols in 
fading environments.  
In most cases of contention game with non-cooperative context in fully distributed 
environments, the games admit the Nash equilibria. Yet, these equilibria do not possess any type 
of global optimality or even paralyze it complete. In cooperative situations, Pareto efficient 
points are preferred for the protocol design’s target. Unfortunately, participants in wireless 
networks hardly cooperate in distributed environments, and Nash equilibria need not to coincide 
with Pareto-optimal points. More details are discussed in following sections. 
3. SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider n wireless stations in the same cell that are willing to transmit data to 
designated receivers. Stations share the same uplink bandwidth. We ignore the downlink 
because it is only used by the base station. Time is divided into many frames. The uplink frame 
structure used here, like the work of Zhang et at [4], is shown in Figure 1. The frame is divided 
into two sections. The first (reservation) section consists of a sequence of minislots used by 
stations to issue access requests. We assume that each station is associated with a single minislot 
so that there is no collision in this section. If a station doesn’t have data to send in this frame it 
has to send a request with zero time slot size. To do this, base station ensures that there is no 
collision attack from misbehavior stations during reservation section. The second (transmission) 
section, transmission time is dynamically partitioned into a number of variable-length time slots 
according to how the bandwidth allocated to the mobile stations. 
 
Figure 1. Uplink frame structure 
At beginning of each frame, stations move data from input buffers to output buffers and 
send requests based on the current data in their output buffers. We assume that if a station 
doesn’t get enough time slot to transmit its data then it will drop all remain data in its output 
buffer. 
We consider the system with many different classes of traffic, assuming that each station i 
has arrival rate λi , and the packet loss probability of user i is given by a loss function , 
where  is the relative rate of station i. The relative rate is the fraction of transmission slot 
assigned to the station, normalized to his arrival rate. That is if station i gets  fraction of 
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transmission slot ( ), then  = /λi . It is reasonable to assume the loss function  
satisfies the two following general conditions: 
1.  Increasing the allocated bandwidth for any given station decreases its loss. That is,   is 
a strictly decreasing function of   .  
2. For any station and any allocated bandwidth, the additional gain (i.e. loss decrement) 
obtained by a given absolute increment in the allocated bandwidth gets smaller as the 
relative increment decreases. This means that the more resources a station has already, the 
smaller additional gain he will obtain by receiving a fixed increase added to his allocated 
resources. 
Two above conditions imply that the loss function is convex, detailed proof is in [8]. Now 
we compute the relative rates that maximize the throughput. We consider the equivalent problem 
of minimizing the total loss 
          (1) 
under the constraint that the fractions of transmission slot, given the the respective stations, sum 
up to 1. 
Theorem 1 [8]. The  achieves its minimum if and only if the relative rates of the 
stations are equal to each other, i.e. 
       (2) 
Proof. See [8] for detail. 
However, if the stations don’t report their true arrival rates then Theorem 1 is no longer 
guarantee for the system optimal throughput. To obtain more share of bandwidth, the selfish 
stations may report more than their real arrival rates. Thereupon, some selfish stations could 
optimize their throughput. While honest stations which report true arrival rate have to lose more 
data. Hence, system throughput cannot achieve optimal or fairness any more. In next section, we 
study insight into the reservation-based protocols considering the existence of selfish stations 
through game-theoretic perspectives. 
4. RESERVATION GAME 
4.1. Game model 
Through this game, the base station makes use of the allocation scheme as in Theorem 1 
and it is public to all stations. By this allocation scheme, a station could declare higher arrival 
rate to receive a larger share of bandwidth.  
The data amounts of stations depend on their arrival rates. When stations transmit some 
data, they will receive some profit. Specifically, we define the profit function   
with x is input data as follows: 
      (3) 
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The profit function means that a station gets no profit if it just transmits dummy packets or 
doesn’t transmit, the more data it transmits the more profit it obtains, hence, this is a non-
decreasing function. Besides, stations have to pay for some cost   , e.g. energy 
consumption. Precisely: 
.        (4) 
To motivate stations to transmit their data, we assume that the profit is larger than the cost 
they have to pay for any transmitted data amount, i.e. α > γ. We define stations’ utilities as: 
.            (5) 
By above definition, we see that the more data stations can send, the higher utilities they 
gain. The utility function can be drawn as Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Utility function 
Stations’ objective is to maximize their utilities. We easily see that stations achieve optimal 
utilities if and only if their allocated bandwidth is equal to what they need.  
Let each station be a player. In the reservation section, a player i chooses his strategy 
∈ , that is the data he declares to the base station, and W is the frame’s capacity. A 
configuration profile  = (  , ..., ) is a specification of strategies for every player. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assume that every station has the same transmission rate, and each station 
needs a time slot x to transmit an amount x of data. We will denote (   , ... , , ... ) by 
. And  = ( , ) will denote the tuple ( , ..., ). We now define the reservation game.  
Definition 1. A reservation game is a tuple ({1, ..., n}, , ), where {1, ..., n} is the set of 
players (stations),  is the set of feasible strategies (i.e. what stations can declare), and  : 
 is the utility function. Each station i selects a strategy ∈  and subsequently 
receives a utility  dependent on the configuration profile  = ( , ).  
We first study the existence of Nash equilibria points. At a Nash equilibrium, every player 
chooses his best-response strategy, i.e. given a set of strategies of other players  , player i will 
choose the strategy  such that it maximizes his utilities. Formally, a Nash equilibrium is 
defined as follows,  
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a configuration profile  = ( , ) at which  ≥ 
(   , ... , , ... )  for all i = 1, ..., n and ∈ .  
At a NE, each player selects his best response to the other players’ strategies, a likely 
outcome if all the players are rational. However, when the system is at a NE point, networks are 
collapsed in most of the cases, e.g. the results in [10], [11]. Therefore, a fair and efficient 
configuration profile is a desirable outcome as a form of “cooperative equilibrium”. Let us 
define the Pareto efficient profile as follows:  
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Definition 3. A configuration profile ∈  is Pareto inferior to another configuration 
profile ∈ , if  ≤  for all i = 1, ..., n with at least one strict inequality. It is 
Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto inferior to any other configuration profile, and fair if  = 
... = . 
That is, a Pareto efficient outcome cannot be improved upon without hurting at least one 
player. From the global performance viewpoint, a fair and Pareto optimal configuration profile is 
a desirable outcome in the cooperative context. Unfortunately, it does not need to coincide with 
a NE. We take an example with the remark below.  
Remark 1. Let  be arrival rate of station i, the configuration profile  where 
 for all i = 1, ..., n, and base station allocates to station i a fraction of bandwidth 
  for all i = 1, ..., n is a Pareto efficient profile. However, this configuration profile 
needs not a Nash equilibrium. 
Intuitively, if , then the system can satisfy all requests. In other words, all 
stations achieve their optimal utilities. 
Otherwise,  , then the allocation scheme where each station i receives a fraction 
 of bandwidth is the optimal solution by Theorem 1. As our assumption, at a given 
profile  is an increasing function, it means that if a station i receives more time fraction 
 then it gets higher throughput. For any configuration  = ( , ), if there exists station 
i such that  > , then to prove that profile  is Pareto efficient, we show that there 
exists station j such that  < . Since  >  implies that  > . We 
have  , so that there exists j such that   <  which implies 
 < .  
The game admits Pareto optimal profile, however, players may improve their utilities by 
deviating from their true reports ( ) to get higher bandwidth when the system doesn’t have 
enough bandwidth for all stations, i.e. this profile is not a Nash equilibrium.  
Before studying the existence of Nash equilibria, we assume that the base station cannot 
recognize selfish stations by examining their packets or monitoring their traffic. Because stations 
may encrypt their data, and also send dummy packets to fill up extra reserved time slots. Hence, 
stations can avoid the detections and penalties. In addition, we assume that the system is not 
always overload or underload. We define an overload/underload frame as follows:  
- Overload frame: total requests is larger than frame capacity  
- Underload frame: total requests is not larger than frame capacity  
At the beginning of each timeframe, stations reserve the bandwidth by sending their 
requests to the base station. Let each frame be a game stage, a station can base on the state of 
previous game stage to make request in current stage. We, hence, model this problem as a 
repeated game. This means that this stage game is played repeatedly. If players are not sure 
when the game will end, we can model this as an infinitely repeated game. The repeated game is 
assumed to be discounted, i.e. the utility received at stage n is discounted by  for some δ < 1. 
Players want to maximize their long term utilities, i.e. maximizing the total of utilities that they 
receive in each single game stage. 
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4.2.  Properties of a single Stage Game Nash equilibrium 
Game stage is an underload frame. In underload frame, stations receive bandwidth as 
they requested. Therefore, a station with truthful strategy (requests as its need) achieves 
maximum utility. This means that the strategy profile  is 
a Nash equilibrium.  
Game stage is an overload frame. In this case, the best response of stations will converge 
to a stable state which is also a Nash equilibrium.  
The institution is that a player i can obtain at least  fraction of bandwidth with strategy 
 . Therefore for a player i who needs less than  bandwidth then he finally finds his 
optimal strategy, say  , to achieve his optimal utility. For players who cannot obtain 
enough time slots for their need then they eventually reach strategy  at which players get as 
much utilities as possible. When a player either gets its maximum utility or its strategy is at 
maximum value W then the system is stable. Because, at this point, no players can increase their 
utilities by changing their requests. Thus, this stable state is also a NE profile. If stations have 
different arrival rates, it’s clearly that this NE profile is neither a fairness nor an optimal system 
throughput. 
4.3. Existence and convergence of Nash equilibrium 
Lemma 1. If the system state is stable in either underload or overload for sufficient long, the 
best response of players converge to a Nash equilibrium.  
Proof sketch. Each game stage is either an underload or an overload frame. At a transition frame 
(changing from overload to underload frame or vice versa), a player with the strategy as the 
previous game stage would lose some utility. However, if the current state stays long enough 
(meaning that δ is sufficiently close to 1), this loss will be overweighted by the gain in every 
subsequent period. This intuition means that in either game state, the system converges to a Nash 
equilibrium eventually.                     
4.4. Bound on Price of Anarchy 
At a Nash equilibrium, some stations might obtain enough bandwidth for their 
transmission, e.g. stations require less than  fraction of bandwidth. Other stations would 
share the equal fraction of remain bandwidth. Thus, we have the price of anarchy of this game as 
below.  
Lemma 2. The price of anarchy is bounded by  , where  ,  is the maximum, 
minimum arrival rate, respectively.  
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that . By Theorem 1, a station i 
receives a time slot proportionally to its arrival rate at the optimal solution, so that its throughput 
is  where . Then the optimal system throughput is:  
.        (6) 
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In a Nash equilibrium, let each station  obtains  fraction of bandwidth with 
some strategy  . We note that   let . While each station 
 receives an equally  fraction of bandwidth. Note that . Thus, total 
throughput at a NE is: 
 .      (7) 
Since stations ∈ in a NE receive more bandwidth than those in optimal solution, we 








   
 
. 
The last inequation holds because the cost function f is a convex function and reversely 
proportional to the input relative rate. In this case, the linear cost function will cause the worst 
result. This ratio is maximum when  and , means, 
.          
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study the reservation-based bandwidth sharing protocols considering 
selfish stations. A deep insight into this non-cooperation system is presented through game-
theoretic aspects. We show the existence and convergence of the Nash equilibrium as well as the 
bound on the price of anarchy. Analysis shows that the optimal bandwidth sharing scheme for 
the cooperation case is not efficient in the non-cooperation case. In the worst case, the system 
 107
throughput is quite far from that of the optimal solution. Therefore, non-cooperative systems 
necessarily need a new treatment.  
In our work, we assume that stations treat their data as the same priority at any timeframe. 
However, if the priority of data is different by the time, i.e. stations’ references are varied by the 
time, this issue merits for further research. Finally, we are still far from the situations where 
stations have different goals. 
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